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December 1, 1993, marked the enactment of substantive revisions to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that will likely revolutionize civil litigation
in the United States.' Undoubtedly, the amendments to Rule 26 regarding
discovery represent the most controversial change. The discovery amendments
require lawyers, prior to formal discovery, to exchange certain core informa-
tion "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings." 2
Described as "radical" even by one of its proponents,3 the mandatory
disclosure requirement has provoked "a flood of objections unprecedented in
50-plus years of judicial rulemaking. Corporate counsel and the rest of the
defense bar have led the opposition, but plaintiffs lawyers, the public interest
community, and even the Justice Department joined in."4
Mandatory informal disclosure, which was initially advocated by Wayne D.
Brazil in 1978,' and later by William W. Schwarzer,6 is designed to
* J.D. Candidate, 1995, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington; B.S., 1992, Indiana
University. Special thanks to Professor Gene R. Shreve for his comments on an earlier draft of this Note.
I. Colleen McMahon & Jordana G. Schwartz, Analyzing the 1993 Amendments "o the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J., Oct. 1993, at 7; Linda S. Mullenix,
Should Congress Decide Civil Rules? No: Not a Subject to Wheel n'Deal, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 22, 1993,
at 15.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(A). Unless otherwise indicated, all references to rules are to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.
3. See Linda S. Mullenix, Hope Over Experience: Mandatory Informal Discovery and the Politics
of Rulemaking, 69 N.C. L. REV. 795, 807 (1991) (quoting Paul Carrington, Reporter of the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules to the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, in his cover memorandum accompanying the proposed revisions to the
federal rules (Feb. 22, 1990)); see also Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. & Kathleen L. Blaner, A Change in the
Rules Draws Fire, NAT'L L.., Oct. 18, 1993, at 25.
4. Ann Pelham, Judges Make Quite a Discovery: Litigators Erupt, Kill Plan to Reform Federal
Civil Rules, LEGAL TIMEs, Mar. 16, 1992, at 1.
5. Wayne D. Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Proposals for
Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978). Brazil envisioned a system in which counsel would view
themselves primarily as officers of the court rather than as partisan advocates. As such, attorneys should
be required under the rules to "search diligently for all data that might help resolve disputes fairly and
to share voluntarily the results of their searches with both the court and other parties." Id. at 1349-50.
Brazil is currently a United States Magistrate Judge. He became a member of the Advisory
Committee on February 26, 1988, and participated in the deliberations which led to the mandatory
disclosure proposal in the amendments to Rule 26. Griffin B. Bell et al., Automatic Disclosure in
Discovery-The Rush to Reform, 27 GA. L. REV. 1, 17 (1992).
6. William W. Schwarzer, The Federal Rules, The Adversary Process, and Discovery Reform, 50
U. Prrr. L. REv. 703 (1989). Judge Schwarzer suggested that the discovery rules be amended to require
prompt disclosure of all material documents and information by all parties at the beginning of every
case. Under his proposal, traditional discovery would be governed by court order, and would be allowed
when there is good cause. Id. at 721-22. The enacted amendment to Rule 26 does not go as far as Judge
Schwarzer's proposal. There is no provision in the new Rule that prohibits formal discovery, although
decreasing the amount of formal discovery necessary for effective case preparation is a goal of
mandatory disclosure. COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL
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accelerate the exchange of basic information about the case and to eliminate
the paper work involved in requesting such information.7 Each party is
required to disclose to all opponents the identity of any person likely to have
relevant information about the case, a copy or description of any relevant
document, computations related to any category of damages claimed, and any
insurance agreement likely to be involved in the case.' Attorneys are to make
these initial disclosures based on the information which is then reasonably
available to them.' After these initial mandatory disclosures, parties may
engage in formal discovery through the use of depositions, written interroga-
tories, requests for production of documents, inspections, physical and mental
examinations, and requests for admission.' °
The mandatory disclosure provision in Rule 26 provoked vigorous debate
at the drafting stage, the Supreme Court-consideration stage, and the
congressional-approval stage of the rulemaking process. The 1993 amend-
ments, touching on some thirty-eight rules and forms, were drafted and
approved by committees of the United States Judicial Conference," and by
CONFERENCE OF THE U.S., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE AND THE FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 53, 99 (Aug.
1991) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT].
Judge Schwarzer greatly influenced the Advisory Committee's mandatory disclosure proposal by
virtue of his position as director of the Federal Judicial Center, a position he has held since March 24,
1990. Bell et al., supra note 5, at 17.
7. FED. R. Cr.. P. 26(a) advisory committee's note.
8. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). The full text of the Rule, as currently amended, provides:
(a) Required Disclosures; Methods to Discover Additional Matter.
(1) Initial Disclosures. Except to the extent otherwise stipulated or directed by order or local
rule, a party shall, without awaiting a discovery request, provide to other parties:
(A) the name and, if known, the address and telephone number of each individual likely
to have discoverable information relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings, identifying the subjects of the information;
(B) a copy of, or a description by category and location of, all documents, data
compilations, and tangible things in the possession, custody, or control of the party that
are relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings;
(C) a computation of any category of damages claimed by the disclosing party, making
available for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 the documents or other evidentiary
material, not privileged or protected from disclosure, on which such computation is based,
including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered; and
(D) for inspection and copying as under Rule 34 any insurance agreement under which
any person carrying on an insurance business may be liable to satisfy part or all of a
judgment which may be entered in the action or to indemnify or reimburse for payments
made to satisfy the judgment.
Unless otherwise stipulated or directed by the court, these disclosures shall be made at or
within 10 days after the meeting of the parties under subdivision (f). A party shall make its
initial disclosures based on the information then reasonably available to it and is not excused
from making its disclosures because it has not fully completed its investigation of the case or
because it challenges the sufficiency of another party's disclosures or because another party
has not made its disclosures.
Id.
9. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(a)(1).
10. FED. R. Clv. P. 26(a)(5).
11. The United States Judicial Conference is the federal courts' policy-making body, empowered
by 28 U.S.C. § 2073 to prescribe the procedures for proposing general rules of practice and procedure
and rules of evidence for federal courts. SUPREME COURT OF THE U.S., AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, reprinted in 146 F.R.D. 401, 501 (Apr. 22, 1993) (statement of Justice
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the Conference itself, despite an enormous amount of negative comment by
the legal community.' 2 At one point, the Advisory Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure deleted the mandatory disclosure proposal from the
amendments entirely. 3 Concerned that withdrawal would unduly delay
discovery reform, however, six weeks later the Committee decided to
recommend a version of the rule containing a slightly modified standard of
mandatory disclosure. 4
After Judicial Conference approval, the proposed amendments were
considered by the United States Supreme Court before being approved and
sent to Congress on April 22, 1993.' 5 Justice Scalia, joined by Justices
Thomas and Souter, filed a dissenting statement to the adoption of the
discovery rules, 6 stating that the reforms "are potentially disastrous and
certainly premature-particularly the imposition on litigants of a continuing
duty to disclose to opposing counsel, without awaiting any request, various
information 'relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity.""..7 Justice
Scalia feared that the mandatory disclosure amendment would increase
litigation costs by adding a further layer of discovery.' 8 Another of Justice
White). The Conference is authorized to appoint committees, which are to consist of members of the
bar and trial and appellate judges, to propose rules. The Conference also appoints a standing committee
on rules of practice and procedure to review the advisory committees' recommendations and to
recommend to the Conference rules and rule amendments as necessary to "'maintain consistency and
otherwise promote the interest of justice."' Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b) (1988)). Rules which are
approved by the Conference are transferred pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 331 to the Supreme Court, which
has "the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure... for cases in the United States
district courts ... and courts of appeals." 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (1988). The Supreme Court then
transmits to Congress a copy of the proposed rule "not later than May 1 of the year in which a rule
prescribed under section 2072... is to become effective." 28 U.S.C. § 2074(a) (1988). The rule "shall
take effect no earlier than December 1 of the year in which [it] is so transmitted unless otherwise
provided by law." led Therefore, unless Congress acts to block the proposed rule during this period, it
automatically becomes law. For a complete discussion of the rule amendment procedure, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 331 (1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 2072-2074 (1988).
12. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 3, at 25.
13. Id.; Pelham, supra note 4, at 1.
14. See Cortese & Blaner, supra note 3, at 25; Ann Pelham, Panel Flips, OKs Discovery Reform,
LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 20, 1992, at 6 (citing Memorandum of Hon. Ralph Winter to Hon. Sam C. Pointer,
Jr. (Apr. 8, 1992)).
The modification related to the relevancy standard for initial disclosure, a standard which had been
a "lightening rod for criticism" of the rule amendment. GENE R. SHREVE & PETER RAVEN-HANSON,
UNDERSTANDING CIVIL PROCEDURE § 71, at 308 (2d ed. 1994). The first proposed standard, governing
information which "bears significantly on a claim or defense," was challenged as being too vague and,
thus, requiring overdisclosure in cases of notice pleading. Id. The 1993 Advisory Committee ultimately
adopted the "relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity" language as the relevancy standard
for disclosure, which is intended to be a more narrow standard. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a).
15. AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, reprinted in 146 F.R.D.
401,403; see also Randall Sambor, At First Hearing on Hill: New Disclosure Rules Attacked, NAT'L
L.J., June 28, 1993, at 3, 31.
16. See AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, supra note 11, reprinted in
146 F.R.D. 401,507 (Dissenting Statement of Justice Scalia) [hereinafter Dissenting Statement]. Justices
Scalia and Thomas also dissented from the amendments to Rule 11. Justice Scalia stated that the
proposal to make sanctions discretionary for violation of Rule 11 will "eliminate a significant and
necessary deterrent to frivolous litigation." Id. at 507.




Scalia's concerns was that the amendment will likely increase the discovery
burdens on district courts as parties litigate over "what is 'relevant' to
'disputed facts,' whether those facts have been alleged with sufficient
particularity, whether the opposing side has adequately disclosed the required
information, and whether [the party] has fulfilled its continuing obligation to
supplement the initial disclosure."' 9 Justice Scalia voiced concern that the
amendment was premature, since the disclosure concept had not been
subjected to any significant testing on a local level, and in spite of the Civil
Justice Reform Act of 1990,20 in which Congress authorized pilot testing of
plans in the district courts prior to major statutory revision to reduce expense
and delay in civil litigation.2'
Despite these objections, the Supreme Court transmitted the amendments to
Congress, the body possessing ultimate authority over the civil rules
process.22 On October 6, 1993, the House Judiciary Committee unanimously
approved House Bill 2814, the Civil Rules Amendment Act of 1993, which
deleted the mandatory disclosure requirement of Rule 26(a)(1).23 The House
of Representatives approved the Bill on November 3, 1993, and it seemed
likely to pass in the Senate, but the Bill ultimately died when the Senate
turned its full attention to the North American Free Trade Agreement and
crime legislation.24 Because the Senate failed to take any action, the
mandatory disclosure amendment automatically became effective pursuant to
the rulemaking procedure on December 1, 1993.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the new mandatory disclosure rule
in light of the criticisms advanced and to determine whether it is likely to be
effective in achieving its intended goals of curbing discovery abuse,
improving the efficiency of information exchange between parties, and
promoting settlement. Part I tracks the development of the discovery rules and
discusses the problems which led to the need for discovery reform. Part II
provides a thorough explanation of mandatory disclosure in the context of the
other discovery rules, in order to set out what the new amendment requires
of the parties to a lawsuit. Part III specifically analyzes the likely effects
disclosure will produce in case preparation, with particular attention given to
the major criticisms and predicted problems of the rule. This Note concludes
that, while the mandatory disclosure amendment will not provide a complete
19. Id.
20.28 U.S.C. §§ 471-482 (Supp. V 1993). Congress provided for pilot programs in federal districts
to serve as laboratories for generating and studying data to determine what changes, if any, need to be
made. Id. §§ 472-473. The Act requires each district court to develop a civil justice expense and delay
reduction plan. The purpose of the plan is "to facilitate deliberate adjudication of civil cases on the
merits, monitor discovery, improve litigation management, and ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolutions of civil disputes." Id. § 471.
21. Dissenting Statement, supra note 16, at 511.
22. Cortese & Blaner, supra note 3, at 26.
23. Mullenix, supra note 1, at 15. The Bill also sought to abolish an amendment to Rule 30(b),
which allows attorneys to tape record depositions rather than using court stenographers. Samborn, supra
note 15, at 3.
24. Randall Samborn, Bill to Stop Change Dies, New Discovery Rules Take Effect, NAT'L LJ., Dec.
6, 1993, at 3.
[Vol. 70:657
MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
cure for discovery abuses, many of the criticisms are exaggerated. In fact,
with proper implementation and judicial enforcement, as well as deletion of
the Rule's opt-out provision, the new Rule is likely to produce favorable
results.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND THE STATE OF DISCOVERY
PRIOR TO THE MANDATORY DISCLOSURE AMENDMENT
The adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 193825 introduced
broad pretrial discovery and thereby began the modem era of federal civil
litigation.26 The prior rules demanded that a complete statement of each
party's legal claims and defenses, along with supporting facts, be explained
in the pleadings.27 Nevertheless, little information was exchanged between
the opposing parties outside of the pleadings.2" The drafters of the 1938
Federal Rules intended to eliminate this element of surprise through a formal
discovery system. Toward that end, the drafters promulgated Rules 26 through
37 to ensure that cases are decided on their merits, rather than through the
clever procedural maneuvering of the parties' attorneys.29
The open discovery process, initially adopted in 1938, rested on two basic
premises.3" One premise suggested that more information is better.3' This
assumption was evident in the Supreme Court's seminal 1947 decision in
Hickman v. Taylor:32 "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered
by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party may
compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession. 33
The second premise posited that judicial supervision of discovery is not
necessary because lawyers will use discovery reasonably in order to avoid
wasting their own time or their clients' money.34 Judges should become
involved only in those rare instances that lawyers are unable to resolve
25. See ORDERS REGARDING RULES OF PROCEDURE, 302 U.S. 783 (1937) (adopting the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
26. REPORT ON DISCOVERY UNDER FEDERAL RULES 26(b)(1), 127 F.R.D. 625 (1989).
27. WILLIAM A. GLASER, PRETRIAL DIsCOVERY AND THE ADVERSARY SYSTEM 24 (1968); Meade
W. Mitchell, Discovery Abuse and a Proposed Reform: Mandatory Disclosure, 62 Miss. L.J. 743, 743
(1993).
28. See, e.g., Koster v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 93 F.R.D. 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) (noting that
prior to adopting the Federal Rules, parties often did not learn their opponent's case until arriving at the
courtroom); Bell et al., supra note 5, at 6.
29. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 703. Schwarzer phrased the drafters' goals that cases be objectively
decided as the desire that .'victory... go to the party entitled to it, on all facts, rather than to the side
which best uses its wits."' Id. (quoting Charles A. Wright, Discovery, 35 F.R.D. 39, 40 (1964)).
30. Maurice Rosenberg & Warren R. King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: Enough
is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579, 581-82.
31. Id. at 581-82. Rosenberg and King point out that the "more is better" premise was fortified by
the initial wording of Rule 26(a), which provided that "the frequency of the use of these [discovery]
methods is not limited" unless the court finds reason to restrict it "for good cause shown." Id. at 582.
This language has since been deleted from Rule 26. The Rule now places limits on the use of discovery
which are enumerated in Rule 26(b)(2).
32. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
33. Id. at 507.
34. Rosenberg & King, supra note 30, at 581.
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discovery disputes on their own.3" The drafters believed this process would
allow an efficient, self-regulating exchange of all existing information.36
The discovery rules seemed to work well during the first thirty years of the
Federal Rules.37 In the 1960's, a survey revealed that fewer than ten percent
of lawyers felt there were problems with harassment, expense, or delay with
regard to discovery. 8 The discovery system was so successful that in 1970
an amendment was passed which eliminated the "good cause" requirement for
document requests and which generally reduced court intervention. 9
By the late 1970's, however, the discovery system became the target of
mounting criticism. The legal community began to recognize the problems
caused by discovery abuse as cases increased in size and complexity." In
1976, at the National Conference on the Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction
with the Administration of Justice (the "Pound Conference"), pretrial
35. Id. at 581.
36. Id.
37. See PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE FOR THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTS RELATING TO DEPOSITION AND DISCOVERY, 43 F.R.D. 211, 220
(1967) [hereinafter PRELIMINARY DRAFT] (citing a field survey conducted by the Project for Effective
Justice for the Columbia Law School and concluding that "there [was] no empirical evidence to warrant
a fundamental change in the philosophy of the discovery rules").
38. GLASER, supra note 27, at 118; Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 703. In 1963, the Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules began a comprehensive study of the pretrial discovery rules. 8 CHARLES A.
WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2002, at 21 (1970). The
Advisory Committee authorized the Project for Effective Justice, directed by Professor Maurice
Rosenberg of the Columbia Law School, to conduct a field survey of discovery. PRELIMINARY DRAFT,
supra note 37, at 220.
A main source of data for the Columbia survey was a collection of in-depth interviews with lawyers
on both sides of 500 systematically chosen sample cases from six selected court districts. A second
sample of 900 cases was generated from 37 additional districts. Questionnaires were mailed to lawyers
on both sides of these 900 cases. Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, 45 F.R.D. 479, 483
(1968). The basic data ultimately consisted of replies from some 2000 lawyers involved in approxi-
mately 1200 cases. Id. In an effort to compare the picture portrayed in reported decisions with actual
practice, the survey also analyzed all reported pretrial discovery cases decided between 1960 and 1964.
Id.
The 1970 Advisory Committee concluded from the results of the Columbia survey that
[n]o widespread or profound failings are disclosed in the scope or availability of discovery. The
costs of discovery do not appear to be oppressive, as a general matter, either in relation to
ability to pay or to the stakes of the litigation. Discovery frequently provides evidence that
would not otherwise be available to the parties and thereby makes for a fairer trial or
settlement.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RELATING TO DISCOVERY, 48
F.R.D. 487, 489-90 (1970). The Advisory Committee also noted, however, that there was no positive
evidence that liberal discovery promotes settlement. Id. at 490; see also Changes Ahead in Federal
Pretrial Discovery, supra, at 488-89.
39. Schwarzer, supra note 6, at 704; see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 26, 33, 34 (1970 version). Although
"good cause" was not ordinarily required to inspect relevant, nonprivileged documents, documents
prepared in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial continued to enjoy "work product"
immunity unless "good cause" could be shown. Changes Ahead in Federal Pretrial Discovery, supra
note 38, at 492.
40. REPORT ON DISCOVERY UNDER RULE 26(b)(1), supra note 26, at 626; Ollie L. Blan, Jr.,
Tightening Up Discovery Procedures, 29 FOR THE DEFENSE 13 (1987); Note, Discovery Abuse Under
the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352 (1982).
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discovery abuses were identified as a major source of concern.4' The general
sentiments of the Pound Conference were thus summarized:
There is a very real concern in the legal community that the discovery
process is now being overused. Wild fishing expeditions, since any material
which might lead to the discovery of admissible evidence is discoverable,
seem to be the norm. Unnecessary intrusions into the privacy of the
individual, high costs to the litigants, and correspondingly unfair use of the
discovery process as a lever toward settlement have come to be part of
some lawyers' trial strategy.42
To cope with the perceived increase in discovery abuse, the commentators
advocated increased judicial control over the discovery process.43 In ACF
Industries, Inc., Carter Carburetor Division v. Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission," Justice Powell, dissenting to the Court's denial of certiorari,
recognized that discovery abuse causes expense and delay. Joined by Justice
Stewart and then-Justice Rehnquist, Justice Powell urged district courts to
supervise discovery:
[A]t least until rule changes can be made, there is a pressing need for
judicial supervision [of discovery abuse]. The district court before which
a case is being litigated is in a far better position than a court of appeals
to supervise and control discovery and to impose sanctions for its abuse.45
Justice Powell cited National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club,
Inc.46 for the contention that
41. SECOND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, 92
F.R.D. 137, 137 (1980) [hereinafter SECOND REPORT]; Warren E. Burger, Agenda for 2000 A.D.-A
Need for Systematic Anticipation, reprinted in 70 F.R.D. 83, 95-96 (1976); William H. Erickson, The
Pound Conference Recommendations: A Blueprint for the Justice System in the Twenty-First Century,
76 F.R.D. 277, 288 (1978); Simon F. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts?, reprinted in
70 F.R.D. 96, 97 (1976).
At the Pound Conference, the American Bar Association created a task force to prepare a follow-up
report on the Conference. SECOND REPORT, supra, at 149. The Report discussed the need for concern
over discovery abuse: "It is alleged that abuse is widespread, serving to escalate the cost of litigation,
to delay adjudication unduly and to coerce unfair settlements. Ordeal by pretrial procedures, it has been
said, awaits the parties to a civil law suit." AMERICAN B. ASS'N, REPORT OF POUND CONFERENCE
FOLLOW-UP TASK FORCE, 74 F.R.D. 159, 191 (1976).
The Task Force recommended that the Section on Litigation, in coordination with the Judicial
Administration Division, "accord a high priority to the problem of abuses in the use of pretrial
procedures and report its finding and recommendations with a view to appropriate action by state and
federal courts." Id. at 192. As a result, the Committee for the Study of Discovery Abuse began studying
problems with discovery. The Committee identified concerns and proposed certain amendments to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure targeted toward reducing discovery costs and deterring misuse of the
discovery process. SECOND REPORT, supra, at 137. The Committee's proposals contributed substantially
to the final version of the discover]( amendments adopted in 1980.
42. Erickson, supra note 41, at 288.
43. See, e.g., Mark A. Nordenberg, The Supreme Court and Discovery Reform: The Continuing
Need for an Umpire, 31 SYRACUSE L. REV. 543, 561-62 (1980) (suggesting that the attorneys' desire
to win leads to evasive and abusive discovery due primarily to a lack of supervision over the process).
44. 439 U.S. 1081 (1979) (mem.).
45. Id. at 1087-88 (Powell, J., dissenting). In ACF Industries, the majority refused to disturb the
court of appeals' decision to overturn the district court's imposition of sanctions upon a party who failed
to answer interrogatories and ignored a court order denying a stay to file answers to interrogatories.
46. 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
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the most severe in the spectrum of sanctions ... must be available to the
district court in appropriate cases, not merely to penalize those whose
conduct may be deemed to warrant such a sanction, but to deter those who
Might be tempted to such conduct in the absence of such a deterrent.47
Wayne D. Brazil documented the perceived need for these amendments in
an extensive survey of attorneys' views of the effectiveness of the discovery
system.48 Overall, most attorneys surveyed believed that there were major
problems with the discovery system.49 Sixty-one percent complained of
evasive responses and refusals to comply with discovery requests.5 Forty-
nine percent of the respondents thought "overdiscovery" was also a major
problem, with nearly forty percent feeling harassed by this practice.5 ,
An official response to Justice Powell's comments in ACF Industries came
with the 1980 amendments. 2 Rule 26(f) was amended to provide for
judicially supervised discovery conferences where issues could be prelimi-
narily identified and a discovery plan could be adopted. 3 The advisory
committee believed that courts were in the best position to prevent discovery
abuse.54 Three years later, the rules were amended to mandate sanctions
against frivolous litigation and discovery abuse and to provide greater case
management and discovery control by judges.55 The 1983 amendments to
47. ACF Industries, 439 U.S. at 1086-87 (omission in original) (quoting National Hockey League,
427 U.S. at 643).
48. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems
and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 787.
49. Id. at 790. Another study of the discovery process, conducted by C. Ronald Ellington at
approximately the same time as Brazil's study, found similar results. See C. RONALD ELLINGTON, U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, A STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DIscOvERY ABUSE (1979). Both studies suggested
serious problems with discovery, including unnecessary use of discovery, improper withholding of
discoverable information, and misuse of discovery. These abuses lead to unreasonable delay and
unnecessary expense.
50. Brazil, supra note 48, at 825.
51. Id.
52. Justice Powell, however, joined by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist, dissented from the adoption
of the amendments. AMENDMENTS TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 446 U.S. 995,997 (1980).
They criticized the 1980 amendments, which ignored the Special Committee's proposals to place
restrictions on the allowed scope of discovery and the number of interrogatories which a party could
serve, as inadequate. The Justices were concerned that significant reform would be delayed for several
years due to these omissions. Id. at 998, 1000 (Powell, J., dissenting).
53. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note; see also AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 85 F.R.D. 521 (1980). In addition to providing for early discovery
conferences, amendments to Rules 33 and 34 attempted to curtail abusive practices involving the
production of documents. Corresponding amendments to Rule 37 sanction provisions were also included.
These amendments to the discovery rules became effective on August 1, 1980. SECOND REPORT, supra
note 41, at 138.
54. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f) advisory committee's note.
55. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11, 16, 26 (1983 version). The Advisory Committee explained that the
amended Rule 11 was meant to deter and punish parties who did not meet the new standards for
instituting or conducting litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. I 1 advisory committee's note. Rule 11 attempts to
stifle discovery abuse by allowing challenges to the legitimacy of the initial filing. Jay S. Goodman, On
the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What Did the Drafters Intend?, 21
SUFFOLK U. L. REv. 351, 364-65 (1987).
The 1983 amendments placed discovery documents under Rule 26(g), while discovery motions
continued to be regulated by Rule 11. Rule 26(g), like Rule I1, provided that the court, upon motion
or its own initiative, shall impose sanctions upon the party or the attorney responsible for a violation
of the rule. Rule 26(g), as amended in 1983, provided in pertinent part:
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Rule 26(b) provided that the court could limit the frequency or extent of the
use of discovery if it determined the discovery request to be "unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or ... obtainable from some other source that is
more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive. 56 Congress also
changed Rule 26(b)'s title to "Discovery Scope and Limits,' 57 signaling a
new attitude toward discovery.
According to a 1989 Harris Poll, however, the 1980 and 1983 amendments
did not improve the process.58 Thirty-three percent of the federal judges
surveyed thought there were many problems with discovery, fifty percent felt
there were some problems, and only three percent believed there were no
problems.5 9 In fact, the poll revealed that discovery problems exceeded all
other problems.6" Judges stated that existing discovery techniques greatly
increased litigation costs, with overdiscovery listed as the main culprit.61
In his August 13, 1991, speech at the Annual Meeting of the American Bar
Association, former Vice President Dan Quayle blamed discovery for the high
cost and long delays of litigation.62 Quayle claimed that more than eighty
percent of the time and expense associated with litigation occurs during the
discovery stage.63
Both the Harris poll and former Vice President Quayle's comments indicate
that the increasing frequency of overdiscovery and abusive discovery practices
is troubling. Overdiscovery occurs for a variety of reasons, some of which are
entirely legitimate. The desire of attorneys to avoid malpractice liability by
being extremely thorough in their discovery efforts is perhaps the primary
reason." Inexperience is another.65 Nevertheless, attorneys commonly
The signature of the attorney or party constitutes a certification that to the best of the
signer's knowledge, information, and belief formed after a reasonable inquiry, the request,
response or objection is: (A) consistent with the rules and warranted by existing law or good
faith argument for the extension, modification, or reversal of existing law; (B) not interposed
for any improper purpose, such as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or needless increase
in the cost of litigation; and (C) not unreasonable or unduly burdensome or expensive, given
the needs of the case, the discovery already had in the case, the amount in controversy, and
the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(g) (1983 version). Rule 26(g) remains substantially the same today.
56. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) (1983 version). In addition, the court could limit discovery under
two other circumstances. The first circumstance involved when the party requesting discovery had ample
opportunity to obtain the information sought FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b). The second circumstance occurred
when the discovery was unduly burdensome or expensive, given the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, and the importance of the issues in the litigation. FED. R. Civ. P. 26
advisory committee's note.
57. Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b) (1983 version) (emphasis added).
58. Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., Judges' Opinions on Procedural Issues: A Survey of State and
Federal Trial Judges Who Spend at Least Half Their Time on General Civil Cases, 69 B.U. L. REv. 731
(1989). The survey questioned 200 federal judges and 800 state judges about problems in the judiciary.
59. Id. at 737, tbl. 2.1.
60. Id. at 735.
61. Id. at 751.
62. Bell et a]., supra note 5, at 9-10.
63. See id. at 9-10, 10 n.22 (citing the Agenda for Civil Justice Reform in America, A Report from
the President's Council on Competitiveness (Aug. 1991)).
64. Mitchell, supra note 27, at 747; Susan A. Yager, Discovery Abuse: Have the 1983 Amendments
to the Federal Rules Curbed the Problem?, 37 FED'N INS. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 399, 402-03 (1987).
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overdiscover to stall for time, to attempt to substantiate a frivolous claim,66
or to force a settlement by exerting economic pressure on a less financially
secure opponent. 67 It is estimated that between eighty and ninety-two percent
of attorneys impose financial burdens on their opponents in an attempt to
force settlement.68
Abusive discovery is never legitimate and should be curtailed. The practice
can be defined as discovery "used as a weapon to burden, discourage or
exhaust the opponent, rather than to obtain needed information. ' 69 Delay,
harassment, and misuse of interrogatories can constitute abuse, as can evasive
responses, withholding information, and general noncompliance." Abuse
tends to be the most prevalent in complex civil litigation, where the amount
in controversy is large.7
In short, it appears that the discovery system is no longer achieving its
original goal of furthering the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
every action."7 2 Although there may be some disagreement over the scope
of the discovery problem, virtually everyone within the legal community
agrees that a problem does exist. 3 Mandatory disclosure has been hailed as
65. Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., supra note 58, at 752.
66. Mitchell, supra note 27, at 747.
67. See Louis Harris & Assocs., Inc., supra note 58, at 752A (reporting that 64% of state judges
and 73% of federal judges believed that discovery was used only to intimidate opponents and therefore
force settlements); Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RuTGERs L.
REv. 219, 244 (1985) (concluding that discovery is often used solely as an economic tool).
68. Levin & Colliers, supra note 67, at 244.
69. William W. Schwarzer, Slaying the Monsters of Cost and Delay: Would Disclosure Be More
Effective than Discovery?, 74 JUDICATURE 178, 178 (1991).
70. Brazil, supra note 48, at 824-25.
71. Wayne D. Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the
System of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 219, 229-33.
72. FED. R. Civ. P. 1. In Herbert v. Lando, the Supreme Court, in holding that judges should not
hesitate to exercise appropriate control over discovery, stated: "[The discovery provisions, like all of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, are subject to the injunction of Rule I .... 441 U.S. 153, 177
(1979).
73. See Bell et al., supra note 5, at 11 (recognizing that "[a] surprising unanimity has emerged that
discovery is now overused and abused"); Brazil, supra note 48, at 789 (finding, based on interviews
with 180 attorneys, that discovery abuse is a serious problem); Thomas M. Mengler, Eliminating Abusive
Discovery Through Disclosure: Is It Again Timefor Reform?, 138 F.R.D. 155, 164 (1991) (commenting
that "although there may be substantial disagreement about the scope and severity of the discovery
problem, there surely is a problem"); Mitchell, supra note 27, at 755 (stating that "[t]he answer to the
discovery mess must come in the form of a simple but effective means that will curtail the adversarial
impact on the discovery process and reduce costs and delay"); Mullenix, supra note 3, at 809
(explaining that "[c]ontemporary discovery practice perpetually has been criticized, attacked, and
generally lamented, a trend that continues unabated"); Schwarzer, supra note 69, at 178 (noting the
"widespread agreement... that discovery, as it is now conducted, spawns some abuse and.., is prone
to overuse leading to expense and delay"); Ralph K. Winter, In Defense of Discovery Reform, 58
BROOK. L. REV. 263, 263 (1992) (finding "precious few ready to argue that pretrial discovery involves
less than considerable to enormous waste"); Note, supra note 40, at 363-64 (stating that the Federal
Rules create an incentive to engage in abusive discovery). But see Frank F. Flegel, Discovery Abuse:
Causes. Effects and Reform, 3 REV. LrTG. 1, 11 (1982) (noting that Judge John C. Coughenour of the
Western District of Washington claimed to have just "five out of four hundred fifty cases that involve
honest-to-God abuse"); Milton Pollack, Discovery--Its Abuse and Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219, 222 (1978)
(claiming that abuse is not found in the ordinary case); David S. Walker, Professionalism and
Procedure: Notes on an Empirical Study, 38 DRAKE L. REv. 759, 781, 783, 785 (1988-89) (reporting
on a study of Iowa civil cases which found that "less than [25%] of the cases sampled entailed the use
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the solution to this vexing problem. The question is whether it will live up to
its billing.
II. EXPLANATION OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE RULE 26(a)(1)
The 1993 discovery amendments attempt to streamline the discovery process
by mandating disclosure of certain information. Revised Rule 26(a) requires
parties to provide, without any formal request, information of three kinds:
(1) initial disclosure of basic information pertaining to witnesses and
documents,74 (2) disclosure of expert witnesses and testimony,7 5 and
(3) pretrial disclosure of evidence to be used at trial.76 This information has
traditionally been obtainable through discovery requests or as a result of
standard pretrial provisions and local rules."'
The first step toward this basic exchange of information under Rule 26(f)
is a mandatory meeting of all parties "as soon as practicable" in order to
discuss the claims and defenses in the case, explore settlement possibilities,
arrange for mandatory disclosures, and develop a plan for subsequent
discovery.78
Within ten days after this required meeting, the parties shall make
mandatory disclosures of (1) the identity of potential witnesses and the
subjects of the information these witnesses possess;79 (2) a copy or descrip-
tion of documents and any other relevant items;80 (3) calculations of any
category of damages claimed by the party;8  and (4) a copy of any insurance
of any formal discovery devices; less than 5% entailed more than five separate discovery events, and
less than 3% involved more than nine," and that discovery abuses occur in "a real minority of the civil
cases in which discovery takes place"). Walker concluded, however, that "[the attorneys' and judges']
conclusions about how well the current system of discovery is working are inconclusive." Id. at 785.
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1). These initial disclosures comprise the "mandatory disclosure"
requirement which is the subject of this Note.
75. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2).
76. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).
77. PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 6, reprinted in 137 F.R.D. 63, 66 (Attachment to Letter to
Hon. Robert E. Keaton, chairman, Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure).
78. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). Unless exempted by local rule, this mandatory meeting must occur at
least 14 days before a scheduling conference is held or a scheduling order is due under Rule 16(b)
(which is no later than 90 days after the defendant's appearance). Id.
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1XA).
80. FED. R. Ctv. P. 26(a)(1)(B). The advisory committee provided some direction as to the scope
of this requirement:
Although... an itemized listing of each exhibit is not required, the disclosure should describe
and categorize ... the nature and location of potentially relevant documents and records,
including computerized data and other electronically-recorded information sufficiently to enable
opposing parties (1) to make an informed decision regarding which documents might need to
be examined ... and (2) to frame their document requests in a manner likely to avoid
squabbles ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l){B) advisory committee's note. If only a description of the documents is
provided, the opposing party may obtain a copy of the documents by formal request under Rule 34 or
by simply asking the attorney. The disclosing party does not waive any privileges or objections
otherwise available by describing documents under Rule 26(a)(l)(B). Id.
81. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(C). This requirement is the "functional equivalent of a standing Request
for Production under Rule 34." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(aXI)(C) advisory committee's note. Parties must also
make available any documents used to compute the damages. As is the case with Rule 26(a)(1)(B), this
requirement extends only to documents which are not privileged or protected as work product. Id.
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agreement which may, directly or indirectly, provide coverage for the
parties.82 As officers of the court, attorneys are required to disclose this
information without regard to whether it is favorable or unfavorable to their
own case.8" Initial disclosures, which are "functional[ly] equivalent to court-
ordered interrogatories," 4 are to be made based on the information "then
reasonably available." 85 The duty to disclose imposed by the new Rule is not
diminished because the party has not completed his investigation of the case,
or because the party feels that his opponent has not adequately complied with
its disclosure duty.86
Mandatory disclosure requirements are limited to potential evidence
"relevant to disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings. 8 7
Nevertheless, since allegations are sometimes "[b]r6ad, vague, and con-
clusory" under notice pleading, the extent of required disclosure under the
new rule should correspond to the specificity and clarity of the allegations in
the pleadings. 88 The greater the specificity and clarity of the allegations in
the pleadings, the more complete the listing of potential witnesses and types
of documentary evidence should be.8 9 Thus, vague pleadings trigger only
minimal disclosure, while detailed pleadings require more extensive disclosure
requirements.
The courts are given broad discretion to eliminate or modify the disclosure
requirements, and the parties, unless precluded by local rule or order, may
stipulate to eliminate or modify the requirements for the case. The advisory
committee suggested that courts could exempt cases, such as Social Security
reviews and government collection cases, in which discovery would be either
unlikely or inappropriate. 90 Likewise, a court may order the parties to
disclose additional information without a discovery request, even though it
does not fall within one of the explicit categories listed in Rule 26(a)(1). 9'
The advisory committee stressed that thd parties are not precluded from
using traditional, formal discovery methods to obtain further information
regarding mandatory disclosures. 92 However, the 1993 amendments to Rules
30, 31, and 33 place presumptive limits on the number of depositions and
82. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(D). Disclosing insurance information does not make this information
admissible at trial. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(D) advisory committee's note; see also FED. R. EVID. 411
(limiting the admissibility of evidence of insurance coverage when offered for certain purposes).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
84. Id.
85. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(1).
86. Id.
87. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(l)(A), (B).
88. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(l)(B) advisory committee's note.
89. Id.
90. FED. IL Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note. By order, the court may eliminate or
modify the disclosure requirements in a particular case, and similarly the parties, unless precluded by
order or local rule, can stipulate to elimination or modification of the requirements for that case. The
advisory committee acknowledged that the disclosure obligations specified in Rule 26(a)(1) will not be
appropriate for all cases, and that it is expected that changes in these obligations will be made by the
court or parties when circumstances warrant. Id.




interrogatories. The new Federal Rules limit the number of depositions to ten
per party, and the number of interrogatories to twenty-five, including all
subparts.93
In addition to the mandatory initial disclosure in Rule 26(a)(1), parties are
required to disclose expert testimony and pretrial evidence. Rule 26(a)(2)
requires each party, at least ninety days prior to trial, to disclose the contents
of any expert testimony by providing its opponent a written report prepared
by the expert. 94 Rule 26(a)(3) requires each party, at least thirty days before
trial, to (1) reveal the names of all expected trial witnesses; (2) designate the
witnesses whose testimony is expected to be presented by means of a
deposition; and (3) identify all documents the party expects to offer at trial,
as well as those it may offer if the need arises.95
Revised Rule 26(e) imposes upon a party the continuing duty to supplement,
at appropriate intervals, both mandatory disclosures and formal discovery as
new information becomes available.96 This obligation also applies whenever
a party learns that its prior disclosures or responses are incomplete or
incorrect in some material aspect. 97
If a party fails to disclose the mandatory information under Rule 26(a) or
to make the proper supplemental disclosures under Rule 26(e)(1), that party
is precluded under Rule 37(c)(1) from using that material as evidence at
trial." Rule 37 provides the court with "a broad range of sanctions to deter
parties from concealing information favorable to their opponents, such as
declaring specified facts to be established, preventing contradictory evidence,
or allowing the jury to be informed to the fact of nondisclosure."99 Neverthe-
less, before a party may make a motion to compel disclosure or a motion for
sanctions for another party's failure to comply with disclosure or discovery
93. See FED. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2)(A), FED. R. Civ. P. 31(a)(2)(A), FED. R. Civ. P. 33(a). This limit
may also be adjusted at the court's discretion.
94. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2). Each party is required to provide any other party with (1) a complete
statement of all opinions to be expressed by the expert and the basis for those opinions; (2) the
information relied upon by the expert in forming his opinion; (3) any exhibits to be used as a summary
or support for the opinions; (4) the expert's qualifications; (5) the compensation to be paid to the expert;
and (6) a list of any other cases in which the expert -has testified at trial or deposition within the
preceding four years. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
95. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(3).
96. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e). "[T]he obligation to supplement responses to formal discovery requests
applies to interrogatories, requests for production, and requests for admissions, but not ordinarily to
deposition testimony." FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) advisory committee's note. Any changes in the opinions
expressed by an expert in the written report required under Rule 26(a)(2)(B) are subject to the
continuing duty to supplement, however. Id.
97. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e) advisory committee's note ("There is, however, no obligation to provide
supplemental or corrective information that has been otherwise made known to parties in writing or
during the discovery.').
98. FED. R Civ. P. 37(c)(1). Sanctions for discovery practices are no longer handled under Rule
11. They are now covered by Rules 26(g) and 37. The amendments to Rule 37 do not parallel the
changes made to Rule 11. For example, Rule 37 does not contain a "safe harbor" provision, and the
court may initiate sanctions under Rule 37.
99. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c) advisory committee's note.
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requests, the party making the motion must have made a good faith attempt
to secure the information without court action.0 0
III. ANALYSIS OF MANDATORY DISCLOSURE
A. Addressing the Criticisms of the New Rule
The purpose of mandatory disclosure is to increase the efficiency of the
discovery process. Mandatory disclosure seeks to reduce the delay and
expense associated with litigation by automatically providing parties with
important information early in the case. It is hoped, therefore, that there will
be less "gameplaying," and that cases can be resolved more quickly. Since the
parties must disclose information early in the case, later discovery requests
will very likely be more specific, resulting in a higher level of response from
the responding party, thereby making fewer subsequent requests necessary.
Earlier access to information should allow attorneys to better assess the
strengths of their own legal theories, as well as those of their opponent(s). As
a result, possible settlement negotiations can begin earlier, freeing judicial
resources and saving the parties the time and expense of later discovery
efforts. The greater equality of information that mandatory disclosure provides
should also lead to fairer dispositions and settlements-a major goal of the
American legal system.
Judge Schwarzer cites six benefits that he believes mandatory disclosure
will produce. He notes that mandatory disclosure of information
allegedly will (1) allow parties to "speed up their evaluation of the case
and [thereby] promote earlier settlements"; (2) "enable parties to target
discovery more effectively, to avoid wasteful activity, and ... [to] take
depositions more efficiently"; (3) allow parties to be better informed at
discovery conferences, so they may better "define and narrow issues and
plan needed discovery"; (4) make the limits on the number and length of
depositions and on the number of interrogatories feasible, "thus reducing
cost and delay in litigation"; (5) "encourage parties to place greater
reliance on available investigatory resources and techniques and less on the
more costly methods of adversary discovery"; and (6) "reduce the
burdensome and unproductive adversariness that now often characterizes
discovery.''.
Critics believe, however, that the negative collateral effects of mandatory
disclosure outweigh any potential benefits from the Rule. The main criticisms
voiced against the Rule are that it (1) may increase satellite litigation over the
scope of required disclosures; (2) will impose heavy burdens on the defendant
under notice pleading; (3) will diminish the adversarial process and,
consequently, undermine the attorney-client relationship; and (4) is premature
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a)(2)(A).
101. Lawrence M. Frankel, Disclosure in the Federal Courts: A Cure for Discovery Ills?, 25 ARIZ.
ST. LJ. 249,271 (omission in original) (quoting William Schwarzer, New Discoveries for the Discovery
Process, LEGAL TIMEs, Nov. 25, 1991, at 25).
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in its adoption. These criticisms are unfounded, however, because the
mandatory disclosure rule will likely improve the discovery system.
1. Mandatory Disclosure Will Not Result in
More Satellite Litigation
A major criticism of mandatory disclosure is its ambiguous "relevancy"
standard. Under Rule 26(a)(1), parties are required to disclose information
relevant to "disputed facts alleged with particularity in the pleadings. 1 °2
Some predict that the new language will promote manipulation and "game-
playing" by attorneys and, thus, create more litigation over sanctions. Lawyers
will either underdisclose by reading the rule narrowly or overdisclose in order
to bury useful information.
°3
The Rule carries strict sanctions for noncompliance, however.' 4 Attorneys
are required to sign all disclosures, thereby verifying their accuracy and
representing that they are not being presented with the intent to harass, cause
unnecessary delay, or increase litigation costs. 5 The failure to make or
supplement the required disclosures can result in the inability to use the
information at trial, which nullifies the incentive for underdisclosure. Other
sanctions under Rule 37(c) reduce the incentive for overdiscovery, especially
if courts clarify standards as to what must be disclosed' 6 and adopt a strict
policy toward noncompliance. Evidence shows that local courts which have
adopted a form of self-executing, mandatory disclosure have encountered
fewer problems over time. 7 Moreover, the increased importance of the
pretrial conference mandated by Rule 16 will give judges the opportunity to
monitor and adjust the progress of mandatory disclosure as needed in a
particular case.
2. The Burdens on Disclosing Parties Are Not Unduly Heavy
A related concern is that the "facts alleged with particularity in the
pleadings" language of Rule 26(a) will place an enormous burden on the party
being asked to disclose information. With the modern practice of broad notice
pleading,'0 8 some critics feel that the responding party will be forced to
expend excessive time and resources in order to avoid sanctions, especially
in complex cases. This argument fails to acknowledge, however, that the duty
of disclosure is directly tied to the level of specificity in the case pleadings.
102. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(a)(1)(A), (B).
103. Bell et al., supra note 5, at 44; Frankel, supra note 101, at 273.
104. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c).
105. FED. R. Cv. P. 26(g)(2)(B).
106. Schwarzer, supra note 101, at 26. Schwarzer claims that the "need for judgment in determining
how to respond [to new language in interrogatories, requests for production, depositions, and court
order] is a staple of a lawyer's work." Id.
107. Frankel, supra note 101, at 276-77.
108. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 8 (requiring that the pleadings contain only a "short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief').
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If the complaint alleges specific facts, then the defendant must provide
information relevant to the facts alleged. On the other hand, if the complaint
is very general, or provides little or no detail, the level of required disclosure,
likewise, is reduced.'0 9 The advisory committee explained:
Broad, vague, and conclusory allegations sometimes tolerated in notice
pleading-for example, the assertion that a product with many component
parts is defective in some unspecified manner-should not impose upon
responding parties the obligation at that point to search for and identify all
persons possibly involved in, or all documents affecting, the design,
manufacture, and assembly of the product. The greater the specificity and
clarity of the allegations in the pleadings, the more complete should be the
listing of potential witnesses and types of documentary evidence."'
Under Rule 26(g)(1), a party is obligated only to make a "reasonable
inquiry" into the facts of the case,' not an "exhaustive investigation at this
[early] stage of the case."".2 Parties engaged in complex cases will not be
more severely affected at this stage, since the level of investigation expected
of a party varies according to the number and complexity of issues; the
location, nature, and availability of potentially relevant documents; experience
with similar types of litigation; and the length of time the party has to conduct
the investigation, either before or after the case is filed."'
3. The Adversary System and the Attorney-Client Relationship
Will Not Be Damaged
Some commentators are concerned that the mandatory disclosure require-
ment will undermine the adversarial process that has been a hallmark of the
Anglo-American justice system for centuries." 4 These commentators argue
that forcing attorneys to disclose information damaging to their clients'
interests will undermine the attorney-client relationship. Because a party and
his attorney must unilaterally determine what information they think the
opponent will need to pursue its claims or defenses, the attorney will have to
"stand in the shoes of the adversary."".. Critics argue that this result would
contradict the traditional role of lawyers as vigorous advocates for their
clients.' 6
The new Rule 26, however, clearly protects the adversary process and the
attorney-client relationship. The advisory committee emphasized that the new
rule still provides the disclosing party with the right to object to production
on the basis of privilege or work product protection." 7 Parties also retain
109. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
110. Id.
111. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(g)(1).
112. VED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
113. Id.
114. See Bell et al., supra note 5, at 46-47.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
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the right to withhold information on the ground that it is not sufficiently
relevant to justify the burden or expense of production." 8
Additionally, the initial mandatory disclosure amendment does not require
the attorney to do anything other than what he or she is already required to
do. Lawyers frequently must read the language in interrogatories and requests
for production and determine which documents the opposing attorney is
seeking. Since the mandatory disclosure rule applies only to "core" informa-
tion which is certain to be the subject of formal discovery requests in most
cases, Rule 26(a)(1) effects only a modest alteration of the law: The attorney
must disclose core information prior to being asked, rather than after.
4. Mandatory Disclosure Is Not a Premature
and Costly Experiment
A final criticism of the new Rule is that it is unwise to enact a remedial
change in discovery, and thus incur the expense associated with implementing
mandatory disclosure, prior to empirical studies of its likely effect. 9 The
advisory committee considered this criticism, but found that testing in local
pilot districts would delay discovery reform until 1998, which it believed was
unwise in light of the substantial resources which could be conserved by
prompt implementation of the Rule. 2 ° Additionally, mandatory disclosure
has already been tested in three districts, and in Arizona, whose supreme court
enacted a version of mandatory disclosure after engaging in a lengthy study
period. Time and expense savings have been realized in district courts that
have unilaterally enacted local rules requiring disclosure of information
similar to that required under Rule 26(a)(1). "' Mandatory disclosure rules
have also had a positive effect on discovery in Arizona state courts."z The
success of mandatory disclosure in these district courts and in Arizona
suggests that mandatory disclosure, if implemented correctly, is likely to
correct some discovery problems, thereby reducing cost and delay. 2 3
Three federal district courts-the Southern District of Florida, the Central
District of California, and Guam-adopted local rules providing for self-
imposed disclosure of documents "reasonably available" to the parties that
relate to allegations in the pleadings. Specifically, these districts require
counsel for all parties to meet shortly after filing an action to (1) "exchange
all documents then reasonably available to a party which are then contem-
plated to be used in support of the allegations of the pleading filed by the
118. Id.
119. Dissenting Statement, supra note 16, at 511-12 (Justice Scalia claimed that it would be "most
imprudent" to embrace the amendment, noting that mandatory discovery had not been subjected to any
significant testing on a local level).
120. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1) advisory committee's note.
121. Id.
122. See generally J. Stratton Shartel, After One Year, Arizona Bar Cautiously Supports State's
Discovery Reforms, INsIDE LmG., Sept. 1993, at 1, available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL File.
123. See Frankel, supra note 101, at 277.
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party"; 24 (2) "exchange a list of witnesses then known to have knowledge of
the facts supporting the material allegations of the pleading filed by the
party"; 125 and (3) "exchange any other evidence then reasonably available
to a party to obviate the filing of unnecessary discovery motions."' 26 In
addition, all three district rules impose a continuing obligation on counsel to
advise the opposing counsel of other witnesses as they become known.'
27
Although no empirical data are currently available, these disclosure
provisions, which are similar to the Federal Rules amendment, "apparently
have not caused major controversy, have been fairly well received, and may
provide a limited reduction in cost and delay."' 2' Federal judges in Florida
and California have reported that their local mandatory disclosure rules are
working very well, and that the rules "really moved things along."' 29 It
seems that "gameplaying"-such as underdisclosure and satellite litiga-
tion-has not been a significant problem.
31
Since July, 1992, the state of Arizona has been operating under discovery
reforms which include a duty of disclosure and presumptive limits on the
length of depositions and interrogatories.'' The Arizona rules, while based
on an early version of new Rule 26, impose stricter requirements on attorneys
and use broader language than the federal rule. Although the federal rule is
considered the preferred formulation because it more clearly and specifically
sets out attorneys' duties,'32 the concept of core disclosure is essentially the
same.
133
According to Arizona lawyers and judges, the discovery reforms have had
a net positive effect on the state judicial system by reducing discovery
motions and eliminating gamesmanship by attorneys. 34 As a result, both
sides know more about their cases earlier in the process, and can therefore
settle cases faster and with lower litigation costs. 35 These positive results
were indicated during a testing of the new rules in a lower court prior to
adoption of the Arizona rules. Of the 8000 cases tried under the scheme,
nearly 3300 were arbitrated eight months sooner than under the old rules,'
36
124. S.D. FLA. CT. R. 16(1)(B)(1); C.D. CAL. CT. R. 6.1.1; D. GUAM Cr. R. 235-5(a)(1).
125. S.D. FLA. CT. R. 16(1)(B)(4); C.D. CAL. CT. R. 6.1.4; D. GUAM CT. R. 235-5(a)(4).
126. S.D. FLA. CT. R. 16(1)(B)(3); C.D. CAL. CT. R. 6.1.3; D. GUAM CT. R. 235-5(a)(3).
127. See S.D. FLA. CT. RL 16(1)(B)(3); C.D. CAL. Cr. R. 6.1.3; D. GUAM Cr. R. 235-5(a)(3).
128. Frankel, supra note 101, at 276. Frankel noted that, based on interviews with judges from these
districts, the low amount of "gameplaying" was largely a result of strict enforcement of the rules by
judges and the bar's ability to become accustomed to the disclosure system over time. Id. at 276-77.
129. Mullenix, supra note 3, at 816 (citing interviews with several district judges).
130. Frankel, supra note 101, at 276 (citing a February, 1992, interview with U.S. Magistrate Judge
Volney V. Brown, Jr., of the Central District of California, in which Brown stated that the "system
works 95% of the time").
131. Shartel, supra note 122.
132. See J. Stratton Shartel, The Arizona Changes vs. Federal Rule 26: Comparing the Pace of
Reform, INSIDE LITIG., Sept. 1993, at 32, available in WESTLAW, TP-ALL File.
133. Shartel, supra note 122.
134. See id.
135. Id.
136. Richard E. Lemer, Legislative Activity in the States, N.Y.L.J., Aug. 6, 1992, at 3, 6.
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and nearly 3000 cases were settled or abandoned by the parties. 137 In
addition, discovery motions were reduced by ninety percent.'38
B. The Threat of the Opt-Out Provision
to the Rule's Effectiveness
Since the major criticisms of mandatory disclosure are exaggerated, perhaps
the largest threat to the success of the reforms comes from the text of the
Rule itself. Rule 26(a)(1), in requiring initial disclosures "[e]xcept to the
extent otherwise stipulated [by the parties] or directed by [court] order or
local rule," gives both district courts and parties broad discretion to eliminate
or modify the Rule's requirements either generally or on a case-by-case
basis.' This opt-out provision relegates mandatory disclosure to the status
of a default rule, used in its original form in only a small percentage of
cases. 40 In fact, as of October, 1994, only 19 of the 94 federal districts,
representing just 19 percent of the 1993 civil caseload in the federal courts,
had fully implemented Rule 26(a)(1). 4 ' Eighteen districts, representing 13
percent of the caseload, adopted the Rule but have exempted certain cases
such as bankruptcy appeals, prisoner petitions, administrative agency appeals,
government collections, and Social Security reviews from its coverage142
Twenty-nine districts, representing 30 percent of the civil case docket, have
no form of mandatory disclosure, while 28 districts, representing 37 percent
of the caseload, have adopted some form of mandatory disclosure that differs
from the Rule 26(a)(1) requirements. 43
The variety of approaches to mandatory disclosure which have developed
under the opt-out system, sometimes resulting in different districts within the
same state imposing different discovery obligations,'" has led to both
confusion among judges and a reduction of the benefits that a uniform
application of mandatory disclosure would produce. 45 Now, more than a
year after Rule 26 went into effect, "many lawyers and judges are still trying
to figure out which set of rules applies and how they operate from one district
to another,"'' 46 a problem compounded by the multidistrict practice of
lawyers. 47 Since the sanctions for failure to comply with disclosure
137. Id.
138. Shartel, supra note 122.
139. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
140. See Randall Samborn, Districts'Discovery Rules Differ, NAT'L L.J., Nov. 14, 1994, at Al, A25.
141. Id. (citing research by Alfred W. Cortese, Jr., and Kathleen L. Blaner).
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. See Donna Stienstra, Summary of Actions Taken by Federal District Courts in Response to
Recent Amendments to Federal Rule of Procedure 26, 154 F.R.D. LVII, LXVIII (noting that the
Northern and Southern Districts of Indiana, as well as the Northern and Southern Districts of Illinois,
are operating under different disclosure regimes).
145. See supra text accompanying note 101.
146. Samborn, supra note 140, at A25.
147. Id. (referring to comments by Carl Tobias, a professor of civil procedure at the University of
Montana School of Law).
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obligations include suppression of evidence, 48 a uniform system of
mandatory disclosure is needed so that attorneys can efficiently and
effectively master the standards of required disclosure. 4 9 Local procedural
variations allow litigation advantages and costs to be unevenly distributed
based solely on the particular forums available for a case. '5 Thus, Rule 26's
opt-out provision, which "increases uncertainty and creates opportunities for
procedural gamesmanship without providing [the] corresponding benefits...
of deciding cases on their merits,... is inconsistent with mandatory
disclosure's goals of promoting efficiency in discovery and eliminating
tactical maneuvering by the parties so that they may focus earlier on the facts
of the case. On the other hand, a uniform rule would reduce surprise and
encourage the deciding of cases based on their merits, consistent with the
purposes of mandatory disclosure.' Therefore, Rule 26(a)(1) should be
amended to eliminate the opt-out provision and to specify in what types of
cases, if any, the mandatory disclosure requirements do not apply. National
consideration of this issue, in light of the results obtained in the local districts
that have exempted certain types of cases versus those that have applied the
Rule to all cases, would allow the advisory committee to determine the most
appropriate scope of the Rule to best effectuate the reduction in cost and
delay the Rule was intended to address.'53
CONCLUSION
Mandatory disclosure, by forcing parties to automatically provide their
opponents with information early in the case, has great potential for increasing
the efficiency of the discovery process. The criticisms of the new Rule are
both exaggerated and, for the most part, invalid. However, no rule acting
alone can stem the abuse and "gameplaying" which is now deeply rooted in
the discovery system from years of inadequate disincentives and judicial
enforcement. For the new Rule 26 to produce any significant reductions in
"gameplaying," judges must make it clear to the parties in a lawsuit that they
are required to cooperate with both the letter and the spirit of the Rule, or
otherwise be subject to full sanctions.5 4 Provided that the opt-out provision
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
149. Lauren K. Robel, Mandatory Disclosure and Local Abrogation: In Search of a Theory for
Optional Rules, 14 REV. LMG. 49, 59 (1994) (explaining that "advocates for uniform procedure argue
that a unified system decreases litigation costs and improves access to courts by allowing attorneys to
master one body of procedural law").
150. Id. at 58.
151. Id. at 59.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 54.
154. One of the most recent comprehensive studies of discovery abuse shows that lawyers blame the
judiciary for many of the discovery system's most severe problems. Wayne D. Brazil, Civil Discovery:
How Bad Are the Problems?, 67 A.B.A. J. 450, 450 (1981). Eight percent of all lawyers interviewed
felt that the courts should impose sanctions for discovery abuse more often. Id. at 456. These lawyers
believe the infrequency and leniency of sanctioning is the root cause of discovery abuse. Id.
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is eliminated, with strict judicial attention to enforcement and the cooperation
of attorneys, mandatory disclosure could have promising effects on the present
system. Likewise, the practical experiences to be had under the new Rule
26(a)(1) will provide solid guidelines for developing improved discovery
reform in the future.
In 1981, a study completed by the Notre Dame Law School, in connection with the Federal Judicial
Center, reached a similar conclusion. The study focused on federal litigation behavior which led to the
imposition of sanctions. The researchers determined that the principal cause of discovery abuses was
lax enforcement:
The typical pattern of sanctioning that emerges from the reported cases is one in which the
delay, obfuscation, contumacy, and lame excuses on the part of litigants and their attorneys are
tolerated... until the court is provoked beyond endurance, At that point the court punishes
one side or the other with a swift and final termination of the lawsuit by dismissal or default.
ROBERT E. RODES, JR. Er AL., SANCTIONS IMPOSABLE FOR VIOLATIONS OF THE FEDERAL RULEs OF
CIVIL PROCEDURE 85 (1981).
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